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J. B. RUHL*

Interstate Pollution Control and
Resource Development Planning:
Outmoded Approaches or
Outmoded Politics?
ABSTRACT
Arbitrarypolitical boundariesare no barrierat all to the physical
effects of pollution and resource development. Yet, despite the optimism that ushered in the heightened environmental consciousness of
the past several decades, political boundaries have posed a substantial barrier to resolving transboundary pollution control and
resource development planning issues. This phenomenon has received
considerableattention on the internationallevel; however, because
of a stubborn adherence to the idea that the states must serve as the
primary jurisdictionalunits for managing pollution and resource
development in the United States, transboundaryproblems are equally
as apparenton the interstatelevel. After reviewing the three principal
approaches the federal and state governments have used to manage
interstatepollution and resource development, this articleconcludes
that each of the approaches has failed in practice not because of
inherent theoretical deficiencies but due to a failure of political
commitment. Only a rethinking of our politics will enable us to
effectively confront and resolve interstatepollution controland resource
development planning issues.
INTRODUCTION
Just over twenty years ago, one of the first scholarly looks at the
problem of interstate pollution in the United States raised the question
of whether cooperation among the states could provide the impetus for
effective abatement of interstate water pollution. Some skepticism was
present in the answer, but optimism generally carried the day in the
conclusion:
[Tihe handling of water quality regulation on a regional basis is so
sensible that it is nearly inescapable. For the time being, the federal
government is committed to the policy that pollution control is essent*ally a local matter. Whether the states can be wheedled or coerced
*Associate, Fulbright& Jaworski, Austin, Texas; B.A. (1979), I.D. (1982), University of Virginia;
LL.M. in Environmental Law (1986), George Washington University National Law Center. This
article is a revised and expanded version of a paper submitted for the author's LL.M. degree. The
author thanks Lisa M. LeMaster and Sherry Young for technical assistance. All opinions expressed
and errors made herein are those solely of the author.
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into organizing themselves regionally to carry out their pollution
control responsibilities admits of considerable doubt, if past history
is any guide. Yet, it may happen that some catalytic factor, such as
the recently enacted Clean Rivers Restoration Act or a report of
unusual success in the young interstate-federal experiment in the
Delaware basin, will generate a wave of new interstate pollution
agencies. The social and political climates seem very good for such
a development.

Such optimism may have been well placed twenty years ago with respect
to interstate pollution control and resource development planning concerns, whether the subject was air, water, or land. If the verdict were
called in today, however, most observers would agree that true interstate

constructs for pollution control and resource development planning remain
mostly the "theoretically attractive solution. 2 Their implementation has
not proven effective in dealing with the necessities of interstate trans-

boundary pollution control and resource development planning problems.
Yet it is even more apparent now than it was twenty years ago "that
certain problems cannot be solved through jealous adherence to state

boundaries." 3 Many pollution and planning problems have simply outgrown the notion of state boundaries. Even regional groupings may be
too small a unit for the primary pollution control and resource development planning jurisdiction. In many ways, a continuing blind adherence

to political boundaries has made solutions to interstate pollution and

planning problems virtually unreachable. While much attention has been
devoted of late to the transboundary pollution and planning problems of
the international sphere,4 no less effort should be directed towards solving
1. Hines, NorAny Drop to Drink: Public Regulation of Water Quality-Part 11: InterstateArrange
ments for Pollution Control, 52 IOWA L. REv. 432, 457 (1966).
2. Hirsh& Abramovitz, Clearing theAir: Some LegalAspects ofinterstateAir Pollution Problems,
18 DuQ. L. REV. 53, 98 (1979).
3. Hines, supra note I, at 432.
4. Because air pollutants are capable of moving great distances in the atmosphere, and of being
conveniently studied and traced by scientists, air pollution has been the principal subject of legal
commentaries on international pollution and resource planning. See Handl, National Uses of Transboundary Air Resources: An International Entitlement Issue Reconsidered, 26 NAT. REs. J. 405
(1986); Pallemaerts, Judicial Recourse Against Foreign Air Polluters: A Case Study of Acid Rain In
Europe, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L, REV. 143 (1985); Regens & Rycroft, Options for Financing Acid Rain
Controls, 26 NAT. RES. J. 519 (1986); Scott, The Canadian-American Problem of Acid Rain, 26
NAT. REs. J. 337 (1986); Wetstone & Rosencranz, Transboundary Air Pollution: The Search for an
International Response, 8 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 89 (1984). However, water resources have also
been the subject of international pollution and resource planning studies. See Sewell & Utton,
"Getting to Yes" In United States-Canadian Water Disputes, 26 NAT. REs. J. 201 (1986); Teclaff
& Teclaff, Transboundary Toxic Pollution and the Drainage Basin Concept, 25 NAT. RES. J. 589
(1985). The presence not only of numerous separate political sovereignties but also of wide intercultural differences makes international pollution and resource planning profoundly complicated.
See Kindt, International Environmental Law and Policy: An Overview of Transboundary Pollution,
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the obstacles posed by interstate boundaries, particularly when the solutions are, in theory, exclusively within our state and federal governments'
control and grasp.
It goes without saying that pollution control and resource development
planning problems can take on interstate and interregional dimensions.
Air, water, and land--each medium is capable of transmitting pollution
and resource development effects across political boundaries. Pollutants
emitted into the air by one state may travel in the airstream and have
deleterious effects on a downwind state's air quality. Polluted water similarly may cross state boundaries by way of oceans, lakes, rivers, and
groundwater flow. Finally, the land and resource development planning
policies of one state, whether a function of state or federal pronouncement,
may affect contiguous states.
If interstate pollution control and resource development planning problems do not recognize man-made political boundaries, why then have the
solutions attempted to date generally adhered to a narrow perception of
the primary jurisdictional unit of control? This article examines that fundamental question of interstate environmental law, offering a prognosis
of where solutions lie for the future. The first section of this article presents
an overview of the essential problems of interstate environmental law
and of the conventional rationales for and against federal involvement in
the pollution control and resource development planning decisions. The
second section examines the legal constraints-primarily constitutional
in origin-imposed on the choice of the primary jurisdictional unit for
interstate pollution control and resource development planning. Wholly
interstate and wholly federal regulatory and enforcement mechanisms
pose a myriad of constitutional problems. Private enforcement schemes
face similar constraints. Thus, constitutional law has been instrumental
in shaping interstate environmental law.
The third section offers a survey of approaches taken under various
pollution control and resource development planning laws for dealing
with problems of interstate dimension. The approaches may be divided
into three broad categories: (1) those relying primarily on federal coercion
of the state's individual programs of interstate environmental management
(the "Federal Coercion" approach); (2) those relying primarily on cooperative interstate agreements relating to interstate environmental management, with or without ancillary federal participation (the "Interstate
Cooperation" approach); and (3) those relying primarily on close cooperation between the federal government and the states, with the federal
23 SAN DiEGo L. REV. 583 (1986); Goldie, Equity and the International Management of Transboundary Resources, 25 NAT. RES. J. 665 (1985); Nalven, Transboundary Environmental Problem
Solving: Social Process. Cultural Perception, 26 NAT. REs. J. 793 (1986).
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government taking on the role of coordinator of interstate environmental
management (the "Federal Coordination" approach). 5 For each category,
a representative program will be emphasized. For the Federal Coercion
approach, the Clean Air Act6 serves as the model program. For the Interstate Cooperation approach, the use of interstate water quality control
compacts is examined. Finally, for the Federal Coordination approach,
federal implementation of the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act is
emphasized.
Following this survey, the fourth section offers conclusions. To the
extent that an assessment of the three suggested model approaches is
necessary in order to suggest solutions for the future, the conclusion must
be that none has proven satisfactory. This practical reality may be more
a result of political infeasibilities caused by interstate competition and
other impediments rather than of the theoretical basis of each of the
approaches. The solutions thus may lie in a rethinking of the politics of
interstate environmental law, not in a rethinking of the approaches.
THE ESSENTIAL PROBLEM OF INTERSTATE ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW, AND THE CONVENTIONAL RATIONALES FOR AND
AGAINST FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE SOLUTIONS
Pollution control and resource development planning problems frequently are of a scope that bears little resemblance to the jurisdictional
boundaries of the affected political entities. When the primary jurisdictional unit for dealing with such problems has a planning and enforcement
authority that is not congruent with the scope of the problems it must
address, little success can be expected for reaching effective solutions.
If the problem transcends political boundaries, so too must the primary
unit of the control jurisdiction. Yet, as one commentator has concluded,
enlarging the primary unit of the control jurisdiction "through some sort
of regional construct is indeed an attractive idea; the problem is its political
feasibility. "'8
5. Other categorizations have been proposed. See, e.g., Lutz, Interstate Environmental Law:
FederalismBorderingon Neglect, 13 Sw. U.L. REV. 571 (1983). Lutz omits the Federal Coordination
approach, but adds "private and public litigation under state and federal law" and "state unilateral
restrictive practices." Id. at 576. However, these are not so much approaches to interstate environmental law as they are either features of constitutional law or manifestations of the various approaches
suggested in this article. That is how they are dealt with herein. The Federal Coordination approach
deserves mention primarily for resource development planning, which Lutz does not treat in any
substantial way. Barring these differences, Lutz presents a comprehensive discussion of interstate
environmental law, albeit with different emphasis and conclusions than are drawn herein. See also
F. SKILLERN, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK §§7.27-7.32 (1981) (Federal
Coercion and Federal Coordination approaches discussed).
6. 42 U.S.C. §§7401-7642 (1982).
7. 31 U.S.C. §6506 (1982).
8. Hines, supra note i, at 433.
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The question, then, really is whether the states--currently the primary
jurisdictional units of control--can be relied upon or expected to bring
about the regional or larger constructs necessary to enlarge the primary
unit to a scope congruent with the problems of interstate effects of pollution and resource development. If the states cannot be expected to fulfill
this role, then perhaps the federal government-the largest jurisdictional
unit of control for purposes of interstate pollution control and resource
development planning in the United States-must somehow bring about
regional constructs or take over the problem entirely. In any event, as
long as the pollution and planning problems are of dimensions wider than
state boundaries, current notions of political feasibilities must bend.
Stated in this way, the problem of interstate pollution and resource
development effects invites rationales for federal involvement in the solutions. Proposals for substantial federal involvement in the field of environmental regulation are often based on four such rationales: (1) the
"tragedy of the commons" effect; (2) jurisdictional constraints on state
regulation of interstate pollution and resource development; (3) disparities
in the power of different interest groups; and (4) superior federal ideals.9
Of these four rationales, the first two provide the strongest reasons for
employing centralized decisionmaking mechanisms to deal with the specific problems of interstate pollution control and resource development
planning regulation. The first-the "tragedy of the commons" effectis the subject of this section.
Centralized decisionmaking is more efficient than decentralized decisionmaking whenever conditions are such that the rational but independent
pursuit by each decisionmaking unit of its own self-interest leads to results
that leave all units worse off than they would have been had they been
constrained to adopting consensual decisions applicable to all.' 0 This
potential inefficiency of decentralized decisionmaking is referred to as
the "tragedy of the commons."" Although the "tragedy of the commons"
provides a rationale for federal involvement, that rationale is not as compelling in the case of interstate regulation as it is in the case of environ9. See Stewart, Pyramids ofSacrifice? Problems ofFederalism in Mandating State Implementation
of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L. J. 1196 (1977). Stewart calls such proposals the
"dialectical logic of federalism," positing that the states are reluctant to implement federal environmental policies to handle intrastate environmental issues. Id. at 1210-22. Indeed, a fundamental
tension in environmental law is between national supremacy and local autonomy. In the interstate
context, however, state autonomy is greatly diminished, and federal policy therefore can be imposed
over the states' reluctance.
10. See id. at 1211-12. As the primary jurisdictional unit of control decreases in geographical
size and political authority, the variety of self-interested parties increases and the potential for
decentralized decisionmaking to lead to inefficient results thus increases. This is not to say, however,
that solving transboundary environmental problems between two political units necessarily will be
any easier than solving them between two hundred.
1i. id. at 1211 n. 65.
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mental regulation generally. The principle aptly describes problems often
faced in interstate environmental law. If interstate pollution and planning
regulation were left to each state's individual decisionmaking, each state
could be faced with a trade-off between fostering its own economic growth
and protecting the quality of other states' environments. It might be
politically difficult for any state to sacrifice increments of its own economic growth for increments of interstate environmental protection, unless
it were certain that other states would compensate the state for its economic sacrifice, either by direct wealth transfers or reciprocal sacrifices.
Even if it were certain that other states would make such a sacrifice, a
rational, self-interested state might choose to let all other states make the
sacrifices necessary to protect the interstate environment, thus benefitting
directly from their sacrifices without affecting its own economic conditions. With all states thinking this way, of course, no impetus for interstate
pollution control or resource development planning exists. Consequently,
each state suffers from its sister states' negligent care of the interstate
environment, and vice versa. Hence the "tragedy of the commons"; each
state pursues its own economic interests, regulating pollution and development only with respect to intrastateimpacts when it is the interstate
consequences that produce the most pernicious results.
As states become aware of the "tragedy of the commons" effect on
interstate pollution control and resource development planning, they might
attempt to negotiate with one another to offset the effect. The transaction
costs of such negotiations would be enormous, however. 2 For example,
if two states reached an agreement to protect their mutual interstate environment, their respective incremental economic sacrifices would place
them at a competitive disadvantage with competing nonagreeing states.
The same would be true of region-wide agreements. Indeed, assuming
any one state is as self-interested as the next, only if all states in competition with one another agreed to make proportionally equal economic
sacrifices would an agreement for interstate environmental regulation
realistically be politically feasible in each state. Even if such an agreement
could be achieved, the monitoring and enforcement costs would be monumental. Each state would face the same incentive to cheat on the agreement that a business cartel member faces. Hence, in the absence of
centralized decisionmaking, monitoring, and enforcement mechanisms,
the "tragedy of the commons" effect poses a significant barrier to successful interstate cooperation in addressing problems of interstate environmental regulation.
12. See id. at 1212. As the number of jurisdictional units whose agreement is necessary to resolve
transboundary environmental problems increases, so too do the transactions costs of negotiating
toward such an agreement.
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According to the "tragedy of the commons" doctrine, centralized decisionmaking mechanisms can avoid the deleterious effects of decentralized
power without incurring the staggering transaction and enforcement costs
associated with collective bargaining among decentralized decisionmaking units. "3As one commentator posits:
The characteristic insistence in federal environmental legislation upon
geographically uniform standards and controls strongly suggests that
escape from the Tragedy of the Commons by reduction of transactions
costs has been an important reason for such legislation. The statutory
structure of federal environmental programs also reflects other economies of scale that help explain centralizing tendencies. Collection
of data and analysis of environmental problems, standard setting,
and (in some instances) selection of control measures involve recurring, technically complex issues; such steps can often be taken far
more cheaply once on the national level than repeatedly at the state
and local level. 4
Nevertheless, this approach appears actually to ignore the problem rather
than address the realities of localized interstate pollution control and
resource development planning issues. In practice, the forces that lead
to the "tragedy of the commons" among the states exist also at the federal
legislative level, burdening the theoretical solution of centralized decisionmaking with transaction costs and enforcement problems similar to
those present in decentralized decisionmaking. States are no more inclined
to approve of their respective federal legislators making uncompensated
economic sacrifices by way of federal legislation than they would be to
approve of their state legislators doing the same through state legislation.
Thus, it is one thing for the federal government to promulgate nationally
uniform air quality standards. 5 In so doing, the federal government has
acted as a centralized decisionmaking unit should-imposing uniform
standards for the benefit of each state which, in the absence of centralized
power, might not have been imposed. But it is an entirely different matter
when interstate effects must be taken into account. Interstate environmental regulation, if it is to be effective, necessarily cannot be uniform
in impact. For example, if one state in compliance with the national air
13. See id. Of course, for this to hold true, the federal government must be vested with plenary
authority to dictate the terms of the states' relations. The transactions costs of the process of the
states relinquishing such authority to the federal government were incurred long ago, however, in
the Constitution. The essential question now is whether the federal government can exercise its
authority effectively. The political difficulties of such decisions are transactions costs in themselves,
thus reducing the advantages of centralized decisionmaking in this particular situation.
14. id.
15. See, e.g., Clean Air Act §§ 109-111,42 U.S.C. §§ 7409-7411 (1982). See also Federal Water
Pollution Control Act § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 131 (1982) (uniform water effluent standards).
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quality standard for intrastate air pollutants nevertheless contributed to a
downwind state's air pollution, pushing the downwind state over the
national standard, the national standard no longer is useful for detecting
and regulating the sources and causes of interstate pollution. Achieving
a solution as between the upwind and downwind states through federal
legislation would be no mean feat. That, nevertheless, is the task at hand,
though the approach may involve something other than federal legislation.
The only meaningful response to this dimension of interstate environmental law may be an interstate agreement or federal law that completely
relinquishes state autonomy in the field of interstate environmental regulation. The "tragedy of the commons" will persist unless such a control
mechanism establishes a centralized authority with plenary power to direct
the level of each state's interstate pollution control and environmental
planning. Such a mechanism seems no more likely from a political perspective to come about in federal legislation than in an interstate agreement. Hence, the rationale for federal involvement that applies generally
in the field of environmental law is not so strong in the field of interstate
environmental law. Indeed, what has provided the basis for federal
involvement in interstate environmental law has not principally been the
"tragedy of the commons" effect, it has been the constitutionally-created
jurisdictional constraints present in interstate environmental law.

CONSTITUTIONALLY-IMPOSED CONSTRAINTS
Approaches for interstate environmental regulation are subject to certain restrictions insofar as the parameters for the exercise of federal and
state powers are set by the United States Constitution. The constitutional
demarcation of authority between state and federal governments largely
dictates which jurisdictional unit of control is appropriate for dealing with
interstate pollution and planning problems, and how such units are to be
established. " The three interstate environmental regulatory approaches
discussed herein were shaped in large part by such constitutional constraints.
Sources of federal power at play in the environmental arena include
the power to legislate (and thereby preempt state legislation) with respect
to interstate commerce, 7 the property power,' 8 the power to consent to
16. See Lutz, supra note 5, at 577-85; F. SKILLERN, §§ 7.22-7.32 (1981).
17. "The Congress shall have Power ... to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States ....
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
18. Congress is granted exclusive jurisdiction over public domain lands. U.S. Const. art. IV,§3,
cl. 2. See, e.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 540 (1976).
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interstate compacts,' 9 and the federal spending and taxing authority.' Of
these, the interstate commerce and compact approval powers are the most
significant in directing federal participation in interstate environmental
regulation. Sources of state power include the police power, as it is
provided for in the Tenth Amendment, 2 and the interstate compact power22
(subject to the federal compact approval power). A brief review of these
constitutional principles is useful as a prelude to the discussion of the
three approaches to interstate environmental pollution and planning regulation.
The Federal Interstate Commerce Power Versus The States' Police

Powers
Congress looks to the Commerce Clause as the principal source of its
power to regulate in the field of interstate environmental law. The interstate effects of pollution and resource development are generally considered to be within the scope of the Commerce Clause.23 The extent of this
authority is pervasive, affecting matters which may, on their face, appear
to be solely intrastate in scope. For example, all "navigable waters",
whether interstate in reach or not, are considered "highways of commerce" and are thus subject to Congress' plenary authority.24 Hence, the
interstate commerce power is a potent source of authority for Congress
to participate in the decisionmaking of interstate environmental and resource
planning law.
More significantly, however, the interstate commerce power creates a
structural barrier to other approaches to interstate environmental law.
Acting in conjunction with the Supremacy Clause,2 the Commerce Clause
19. A state may "enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State" with "the consent
of Congress." U.S. Const. art. Ill, §2. The approval requirement is limited to compacts "that are
directed to the formation of any combination tending to the increase of political power in the states,
which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States." United States
Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 471 (1978).
20. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. I. The federal spending and taxing powers provide an effective
method for the federal government to implement its commerce power "to accomplish various objectives of intergovernmental and interstate cooperation through incentive and disincentive provisions
for certain types of private, municipal, and state behavior." Lutz, supra note 5, at 570 n. 19.
21. U.S. Const. amend. X.
22. U.S. Const. art. Il, § 2.
23. There hardly could be a dispute over Congress' power to regulate interstate pollution and
resource planning under its commerce clause authority. For example: fishery resources are affected
by interstate water pollution; forestry resources are affected by interstate air pollution; land planning
resources are affected by interstate development issues. See Lutz, supra note 5, at 577.
24. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 455 (1985); United States
v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 708 (1899); see generally Lutz, supra note 5,
at 577-78.
25. Laws of the United States are "the Supreme Law of the Land ....
U.S. Const. art. VI.
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enables the federal government to "preempt" the field of interstate environmental regulation.' Preemption exists where Congress has provided
law over a subject matter with the express intent that such law be exclusive

of state regulation.

Preemption also exists where the subject matter

inherently is of national scope or has been regulated pervasively, so that
a congressional intent to preempt state regulation can be inferred.' Finally,

in the case of the interstate commerce power, preemption has its "dormant" aspect: even where Congress has not acted to regulate a subject
of interstate scope, state laws cannot prohibit or impede areas of interstate
commerce within the exclusive domain of federal regulation. 29
Through these mechanisms, preemption creates structural constraints
in interstate environmental law. First, where Congress has actively preempted
a field of interstate environmental regulation, state regulation is permitted
only to the extent allowed by Congress? 0 Interstate pollution and development effects can thereby be controlled by active federal regulation. 3 1
Where the federal regulatory power is dormant, however, federal common

law or state common law remedies still may be available. 32 But certain

state regulatory efforts remain impeded by the dormant power of the
26. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
27. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984).
28. See id;see generally, L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 6-1 to 6-5; G. GUNTHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 277-93 (9th ed. 1975).
29. See Arkansas Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Arkansas Public Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375, 389-90 (1983);
see generally Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425 (1982); Lutz,
supra note 5, at 581; Soper, The Constitutional Framework of Environmental Law, in FEDERAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 78-81 (E. Dolgin & T. Gilbert, eds. 1974).
30. Preemption thus is not an all-or-nothing proposition. Congress can, for example, prescribe
minimum environmental standards which all states must meet but are free to exceed through separate
state regulation. See, e.g., Solid Waste Disposal Act § 3009, 42 U.S.C. § 6929 (1982) (hazardous
waste management standards); Clean Air Act § 116, 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (1982) (air quality standards).
31. See, e.g., S. 316 and S.321, 100th Cong., IstSess. (1987). Recognizing that "current levels
of emissions of air pollutants from existing sources as well as increased emissions from new and
existing sources threaten public health and welfare and the environment in states and countries other
than those in which emitted," these bills have as their specific goal protection against interstate
transport of air pollutants. Both bills also posit that "the problem of acid deposition ... cannot be
addressed adequately without Federal intervention."
The problem of acid deposition, also known as acid rain, has been one of the most vexing for
Congress in recent years and illustrates the difficulty of implementing the Federal Coercion approach
when decisionmaking remains essentially decentralized or fixated on state political boundaries. Acid
coalrain in the United States generally is portrayed as a problem caused by midwestern states'
powered industrial plants and suffered by northeastern states' lakes and forests. On the other hand,
northeastern states import electric power from midwestern states, i.e., from the very coal-powered
plants which are alleged to be the source of acid rain. Achieving a legislatively-directed solution
balancing the interests of both regions will be a delicate process. It has proven beyond Congress'
grasp thus far. See generally Wood, Acid Rain and the Clean Air Act: Agency Inaction and the Need
for Legislated Reform, 6 VA. J. NAT. RES. L. 213 (1986).
32. See International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 107 S. Ct. 805 (1987); Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451
U.S. 304 (1981); Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972). This trilogy of cases describes the
constitutional interplay between federal legislation, federal common law, and state statutory and

Spring 19881

INTERSTATE POLLUTION CONTROL

Commerce Clause. This effect is particularly acute in the field of interstate
environmental laws. State laws designed to resist the infusion of transboundary pollution and resource development effects face stiff scrutiny
under the Commerce Clause." Similarly, state regulation affecting the
export of resources has Commerce Clause implications. 4 The preemption
doctrine, therefore, constricts the choices available for approaching problems of interstate environmental law.
The preemption doctrine has its limits, however, particularly as it
operates under the Commerce Clause. The Tenth Amendment serves both
to limit federal authority and to reserve a residual "police power" to each
state. Among a state's police powers, the power to regulate land use
within its boundaries has great import for environmental law."- Nevertheless, this aspect of the police power is unlikely to play an important
common law for disputes involving interstate environmental pollution control and resource planning.
That interplay essentially is as follows: In the absence of federal legislation, federal common law
preempts state statutory and common law; however, federal legislation can preempt both federal
common law and state statutory and common law, or it may preempt federal common law while
resurrecting nonconflicting state statutory and common law. See generally, Murchison, Interstate
Pollution: The Need For Federal Common Law, 6 VA. J. NAT. REs. L. 1 (1986).
33. For example, in Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1980), the Court invalidated a
New Jersey statute that prohibited disposal of solid waste generated outside New Jersey in landfills
in the state, even though Congress had enacted no legislation covering the subject. See generally
Florini, Issues of Federalism in Hazardous Waste Control: Cooperation or Confusion?, 6 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 307 (1982); Dister & Schlesinger, State Waste Embargos Violate the Commerce
Clause: City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 371 (1979). The applicable principles
in this area are likely to be tested again in the near future as states consider legislation which would
nominally avoid interstate discrimination by banning or severely limiting all commercial disposals
of hazardous waste within the state. For example, Alabama has considered banning all new commercial hazardous waste disposal facilities, see Ala. H.B. 327 (1988), and Mississippi has considered
legislation requiring county-wide popular votes to decide whether to allow such new facilities, which
is effectively a ban. See Miss. H.B. 333 (1988). Proponents of such legislation acknowledge its
purpose is in part to restrict inflow of waste from other states. Federal policy is certain to conflict
with any state law of this sort that is enacted. See Letter from J. Winston Porter, United States
Environmental Protection Agency Assistant Administrator, to State Environmental Commisisoners
(Sept. 14, 1987) (suggesting possible actions against states '"[erecting statutory barriers to hazardous
waste management"). But see Evergreen Waste Systems, Inc. v. Metropolitan Service District, 820
F.2d 1482 (9th Cir. 1987) (municipal ordinance proscribing use of landfill by those outside metropolitan area treated out-of-state and most in-state waste evenly and thus did not run afoul of commerce
clause); LeFrancois v. Rhode Island, No. 87-361-P (D.R.I. Sept. 15, 1987) (state-run landfill may
exclude out-of-state waste where much in-state waste also excluded).
34. See Stewart, Interstate Resource Conflicts: The Role of the Federal Courts, 6 HARy. ENvTL.
L. REV. 241 (1982). This question typically comes up in the case of severance taxes on resources
such as coal.
35. The Supreme Court has had considerable difficulty delineating the boundary between federal
supremacy powers, which must find their origin among the authorities enumerated in the Constitution,
and state police powers, which are reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment. See Garcia
v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (5-4 decision), overruling National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (5-4 decision). Land use regulation in the form of
zoning was first concluded to be within the states' police powers in Village of Euclid v. Amber
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926), and more recently was confirmed as being potentially so
pervasive in scope and effect as to constitute a taking of property requiring just compensation under
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role in interstate environmental law. Although it often is difficult to draw
the line where federal authority ends and state police powers begin, the

interstate effects of pollution and development necessarily fall within the
federal domain.' Hence, the opportunity for federal participation in interstate environmental law has been attributable largely to constitutionally-

based restrictions on unilateral state efforts to control interstate prob-

lems.3" As is discussed below, however, that opportunity has not been
taken advantage of to any meaningful degree.
Interstate Compacts And The Federal Compact Approval Power
States are permitted by the Constitution, with the consent of Congress,
to enter into agreements and compacts with each other.3" While most such
compacts involve boundary disputes, navigation, taxation, penal laws and
public utilities,39 a number of compacts have been entered into to deal
with interstate pollution and resource development effects. Water pollution
abatement has been the principal objective of such compacts," ° but air
pollution4 and land use planning42 have also been the subject of compacts.

Pursuant to the Compact Clause, federal approval of any interstate
compact dealing substantially with interstate environmental regulation is
necessary. Congress has at times indicated that it would encourage the
use of the interstate compact device in dealing with interstate environthe Fifth Amendment. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles, 107 S.Ct. 2378 (1987). Although several federal enactments affect land development, see,
e.g., Clean Water Act §404, 33 U.S.C. § 1304 (1982) (restricting development in waters of the
United States); Endangered Species Act §7, 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1982) (restricting development
interfering with the critical habitat of endangered species), no comprehensive federal land use
planning law exists. The extent to which Congress could regulate intrastate, as opposed to interstate,
land use planning on a comprehensive, preemptive scale thus is uncertain. See generally Lutz, supra
note 5, at 581-84; Note, The Tenth Amendment and Environmental Legislation, 13 ENvTL. L. 265
(1982).
36. See International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 107 S. Ct. 805 (1987).
37. In a sense, however, the extent of federal participation is a function of the jealousy with
which Congress guards its Commerce Clause authority rather than relinquishing it to the states as
it may. Except in the realm of admiralty, see Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (920),
the ability of Congress to authorize the states to regulate interstate commerce is unquestioned.
38. For discussions of interstate environmental compacts, see Hirsh & Abramovitz, supra note
2; Curlin, The Interstate Water Pollution Compact-Paper Tiger or Effective Regulatory Device?, 2
ECOLOGY L.Q. 333 (1972); Weakly, Interstate Compacts in the Law ofAir and Water Pollution, 3
NAT. RES. L. 81 (1970); Hines, supra note I; Note, Glowing Their Own Way: State Embargoes
and Exclusive Waste-Disposal Sites Under the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980, 53
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 654 (1985); Note, Interstate AgreementsforAir Pollution Control, 1968 WASH.
U. L.Q. 260 [hereinafter Note, Interstate Agreements].
39. See Lutz, supra Note 5, at 579 n.18.
40. See Curlin, supra note 38.
41. See Hirsh & Abramovitz, supra note 2; Weakly, supra note 38; Note, Interstate Agreements,
supra note 38.
42. See Tobin, The Interstate Metropolitan District and Cooperative Federalism, 36 TUL. L. REV.
67 (1961).
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mental problems, 43 but the federal approval process is slow and has all

too often proven to be unavailing. For example, federal approval of
interstate environmental compacts dealing with air pollution control has
been guided by the following strict compact criteria issued by the Senate
Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution:

a. Only the states in a designated air quality region should participate
in the compact. A compact should provide for participation by all

states encompassed by a given air quality region.
b. Federal representatives should serve but not vote on the compact
commission.
c. Each participating state should have one vote on the compact commission.
d. The compact commission should have broad air monitoring, standard setting and enforcement powers.
e. The meeting by the states of obligations imposed by the federal air
pollution legislation should be enhanced by the compact.'
Accordingly, federal approval of interstate environmental compacts has
been routinely denied when one or more of the following perceived defects
exists in compact proposals: (1) inadequate standard-setting and enforcement procedures; (2) limited prevention action; (3) absence of federal
representation altogether; and (4) excessive federal representation, that
is, voting power.45 Hence, it is apparent that the interstate compact power
could become an effective approach to interstate environmental regulation, but that Congress is not willing to replace its Federal Coercion
approach with interstate compacts unless the states relinquish corresponding degrees of autonomy to the compact enforcement mechanism. States
must consciously seek to avoid the "tragedy of the commons" by making
their interstate compacts more than mere formalizations of their preexisting relations.
REPRESENTATIVE MODELS OF THE THREE APPROACHES TO
INTERSTATE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Federal Coercion Programs: The Clean Air Act
So much has been written about the Clean Air Act' and its implications
43. The Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act (Federal Water Pollution Control Act) explicitly
approve of such compacts, though congressional approval is still required. See Clean Air Act § 102,
42 U.S.C. § 7402 (1982); Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 103, 33 U.S.C. § 1253 (1982). See
also similar provisions in the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2021d(a)(2)(A)
(1982), and Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §6904 (1982).
44. See Hirsh & Abramovitz, supra note 2, at 99; Hearings on Air Pollution Compacts Before
the Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Commitee on Public Work, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. 464 (1968).
45. See Hirsh & Abramovitz, supra note 2, at 99.
46. 42 U.S.C. §§7401-7642 (1982).
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for interstate environmental law that only a brief review of the structure
of the Act is necessary here. 47 The main focus of this discussion is on
the effectiveness of the Act in dealing with interstate air pollution. The
general consensus is that the Act, as administered by the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), has proven in this regard to be inadequate in
a number of respects.
Section 110(a)(2)(E) of the Clean Air Act requires that each state
develop a State Implementation Plan (SIP) for achieving nationally uniform ambient air quality standards and for implementing Prevention of
Significant Deterioration (PSD) measures.48 No SIP will be approved
unless it contains provisions preventing any stationary air pollution source
in the state from interfering with the attainment or maintenance by any
other state of the air quality standards and PSD measures.49 Section 126
of the Act' requires each state to notify all nearby states of major existing
stationary sources that may contribute to violations of the standards and
measures by those states. Any new sources or modifications of existing
stationary sources that would affect nearby states must be identified to
those states as well." Thus, to the extent the Act addresses interstate air
pollution from stationary sources, the approach is clearly one in which
the federal government has attempted to coerce the states into dealing
with interstate pollution and planning regulation.
The Act ostensibly provides mechanisms for enforcing its interstate
pollution provisions and for resolving disputes between states. Section
126 of the Act allows states and local governments to petition the EPA
for a finding that an existing or proposed major stationary source in another
state emits or will emit air pollutants that will interfere with the state or
local government's SIP. If EPA makes a finding to that effect, the state
from which the air pollution is migrating is charged with a violation of
its SIP. 2 A compliance schedule can be established requiring the offending
state to eliminate the interstate pollution within three years. 3
Commentators charge the Section 126 petition procedure with suffering
47. For a more extensive discussion, see Lutz, supra note 5, at 586-94; Ostrov, Interboundary
Stationary Source Pollution--Clean Air Act Section 126 and Beyond, 8 COLUM. J. ENvmt. L. 37
(1982); Lee, Interstate Sulfate Pollution: Proposed Amendments to the Clean Air Act, 5 HARV.
ENVT. L. REv. 71 (1981); Silverstein, InterstateAirPollution: Unresolved Issues, 3 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 291 (1980); Henderson & Rearson, Implementing Federal Environmental Policies: The
Limits of Aspirational Commands, 78 COLuM. L. REv. 1429 (1978); Hirsh & Abramovitz, supra
note 2.
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(E) (1982).
49. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(E)(i)(I) (1982).
50. 42 U.S.C. §7426 (1982).
51. See § 7426(a) (1982).
52. See § 7426(b) (1982).
53. See § 7426(c) (1982).
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from two major defects: (1) the EPA is limited to enforcement against
the offending state only, and (2) the procedure only protects against violations of the national standards.54 As the discussion of the "tragedy of
the commons" effect illustrates, in most cases it would be more appropriate to require both the emitter and receiver states to reduce their respective intrastate emissions and share the corresponding economic sacrifices.
When the full impact can be placed on only the emitter state, the EPA
is less likely to implement Section 126 unless the interstate pollution is
drastic, and the emitter state is likely to be recalcitrant in its approach to
EPA's orders. Moreover, because the threshold levels for Section 126
implementation are the national uniform standards, interstate pollution is
essentially not recognized as a problem until that threshold is met. This
makes it difficult to interpret how the petition procedure is to be implemented. For example, if a state emits no pollution itself, can an adjoining
state's interstate pollution "use up" that state's threshold level? Or, if a
state is only marginally within the national standard, does the adjoining
state's de minimus interstate pollution contribution cause a violation of
the interstate pollution provisions? The Act is unclear on how to resolve
the petition procedure in such instances, because interstate pollution is
not recognized except as a function of the national standards." Therefore,
at the very least, the Act must be modified to define the permissible
parameters of interstatepollution, regardless of its effect on the receiving
state's SIP.56
The defects of the Clean Air Act illustrate the pitfalls of the Federal
Coercion approach. Interstate pollution must be dealt with as a discrete
element of pollution. Nationally uniform standards do not address interstate pollution adequately, and a focus only on the source of the interstate
pollution disregards the equitable considerations involved in any interstate
problem. Because of the potential for preemption and the political ramifications, the states are not likely to go any further to address interstate
pollution once the federal government purports to address it. Thus, if the
Federal Coercion approach is taken, the federal scheme must be complete,
which includes dealing head on with interstate pollution and resource
planning effects. Whether such completeness is politically feasible at the
federal level is a more difficult question, but the problem cannot be
adequately solved by halfway measures. Political interests therefore must
54. See, e.g.. Lutz, supra note 5, at 590-91; Lee, supra note 47, at 82.
55. See Post, Federal Common Law Suits to Abate Interstate Air Pollution, 4 HARv. ENVTL. L.
REV. 117, 121 n.42 (1980).
56. See, e.g., S.B. 316 and SB. 321, supra note 31; see generally Lee, supra note 47, at 8388. Recently, some states have taken an aggressive approach under the Clean Air Act, suing EPA
in order to force action on interstate air pollution problems. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Thomas, No.
87-C0395 (E.D. Wis.) (suit filed Apr. I, 1987).
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learn to adjust to the necessities of the problem by recognizing that
effective measures cannot treat all states equally, or else learn to live with
it, which ultimately may prove even more politically disastrous.
Interstate Cooperation Approach: Interstate Water Quality Control
Compacts
The interstate effects of water pollution have been recognized and
understood for a much longer time than those of air pollution. 57 Moreover,
because of strong state concerns for water management,5" many state
institutional arrangements for dealing with interstate water pollution have
developed. The interstate compact process has proven to lend itself to
' than as an effective
this process, though perhaps more as a "paper tiger" 59
enforcement mechanism.
A number of interstate compacts now in operation refer to water pollution control as a subject regulated by the agreement.' Such agreements
typically establish a commission having express powers granted by the
agreement, and federal representation on the commission has proven
essential for federal approval. To regulate interstate water pollution, most
commissions are authorized to establish water quality standards and to
enforce them. 6' Alternatively, the water quality standards may be enforced
directly in the courts.62 Ideally, a compact covering interstate water pollution should contain all of these features.
However, only a few interstate water quality control compacts exhibit
strong commitment by the member states in practice. The Ohio River
Valley Water Sanitation Compact6 3 is probably the best example of an
effective interstate compact. The interstate agency established by the
compact is authorized to monitor stream water quality, maintain warning
procedures, investigate citizen complaints, and patrol the river waters.'
But many compacts fail to live up to their stated purposes, and the federal
government is partly to blame for this. The Federal Water Pollution
Control Act pays only lip service to the compact process,65 and the federal
57. See generally Lutz, supra note 5, at 594.
58. See 33 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1972) (current version at 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1982)), recognizing
"the primary responsibilities and rights of the states in preventing and controlling water pollution"
59. Curlin, supra note 38, at 354.
60. See id. at 345 (providing examples).
61. See id. at 345-52 (providing examples).

62. See id. at 352-53 (providing examples).
63. See id. at 353.
64. See id.
65. See 33 U.S.C. § 1253(b) (1982), which provides the consent of Congress "to two or more
states to negotiate and enter into agreements or compacts . . . for the prevention and control of
pollution," but which also provides that "[N]o such agreement or compact shall be binding or
obligatory upon any state a party thereto unless and until it has been approved by the Congress."
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approval process is burdensome. States are equally to blame for not
charging the interstate commissions with adequate regulatory and enforcement powers. Overall, neither the states nor the federal government have
utilized the compact process to its full potential for addressing interstate
water pollution problems. And the compact process has proven no more
effective in dealing with air pollution or land development.' Nor have

other informal arrangements been entered into to any widespread degree.
Hence, the Interstate Cooperation approach faces the same pitfall as the
Federal Coercion approach-lack of completeness due to lack of commitment.
The Federal Coordination Approach: The Intergovernmental
Cooperation Act
A number of metropolitan areas include counties from more than one
state or have suburban fringes spilling over state boundaries. The "expansion of metropolitan areas has occurred without regard for arbitrary political boundaries. In the course of this dynamic growth many state borders
have been crossed, leaving numerous metropolitan communities divided
by the most formidable of all domestic political barriers, the state line. "67
Nevertheless, land remains the most locally-managed resource. "[L]and
use regulations are the least likely to be made the subject of interstate
efforts initiated by states or the federal government, despite indications
that land policies in one jurisdiction have the potential for environmental
spill-over effects in neighboring areas. ' ' " Interstate agreements establishing regional resource development planning agencies thus should be
actively encouraged by the federal government and used by the state
governments 69
The federal role in interstate resource development planning has been
largely passive, however. This may be because the local grip on land
planning has remained tight. But with the growth of the federal grant
66. See supra notes 41-42.
67. Tobin, supra note 42, at 67.
68. Lutz, supra note 5, at 585. For a discussion of how interstate groundwater and nonpoint
source water pollution is exacerbated by treating land use regulation as a "purely local concern,"
see Note, State and Federal Land Use Regulation: An Application to Groundwater and Nonpoint
Source Pollution Control, 95 YALE L.J. 1433 (1986).
69. See Tobin, supra note 42, at 68. Indeed, the author in Note, supra note 68, contends that a
federal coercion approach should be taken whereby "[tihe EPA should develop guidelines for state
programs; if a state does not comply, the EPA must take enforcement measures." id. at 1456.
However, by also calling for "[fQederal guidelines . . . promoting uniformity among the states,"
id., and the promulgation of "appropriate ambient standards" id. at 1457, the author appears to
conceive of a program much like the Clean Air Act in operation, which would not adequately address
interstate pollution effects. Moreover, the author's focus on federal encouragement of individual
state programs would perpetuate the current neglect of region-wide approaches.
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machine in areas of land use and other planning functions, the federal
government might have been expected to have relied on the Federal
Coercion approach to interstate resource development planning. This has
not come to be. Instead, the federal commitment to interstate resource
development planning never surpassed the Federal Coordination approach,
and has in recent years receded even from that level of participation.
The history of federal involvement in interstate resource development
planning can be traced to the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968,7
which provides for federal promulgation of "regulations governing the
formulation, evaluation, and review of United States government programs and projects having a significant impact on area and community
development" so as to ensure the "sound and orderly development of
urban and rural areas." 7 ' The regulations are to encompass such planning
objectives as land use, natural resource conservation, transportation, rec-72
reation, open space, historic areas, public utilities, and design standards.
"To the extent possible, all national, regional, state and local viewpoints
7
shall be considered in planning development programs and projects," 1
and federal "assistance for development purposes shall be consistent with
and further the objectives of state, regional, and local comprehensive
planning." '74 Finally, federally-required planning must be coordinated with
and made part of comprehensive local and area-wide development planning. 75
The history of the implementation of the Act provides an example of
the shifting emphasis between federal and state coordination of resource
development planning.76 Potentially, the Cooperation Act could have served
as the source for a strong Federal Coercion or Federal Coordination
approach to national planning, for the President is vested with the power
to make "assistance for development purposes ' 77 contingent upon coor70. 31 U.S.C. §6506 (1982).
71. Id. § 6506(b).
72. See id. §6506(b)(l)-(7).
73. Id. § 6506(c).
74. Id. §6506(d).

75. See id. § 6506(e). Section 207 of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development
Act of 1966, 42 U.S.C. § 3334 (1982), requires that applications for federal loans or grants for
assistance in planning or construction in metropolitan areas be submitted "to any areawide agency
which is designated to perform metropolitan or regional planning for the area within which the
assistance is to be used." Section 3334(a)(1). The areawide agency is required to comment upon
the application to assist the federal government in reviewing the application. Rules for the implementation of this coordination requirement are authorized and have been promulgated in conjunction
with rules for the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act.
76. See Osbourn, The FederalInterest in Metropolitan Regional Governance (1984) (Testimony

Before the Senate Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations in written submission form); Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Information Bulletin No. 82-3, Appendix C,
Intergovernmental Consultation Changes Provide Alternatives (1982) [hereinafter Bulletin].
77. 31 U.S.C. § 6506(d) (1982). Because of the substantial involvement of the federal government
in providing financial assistance to state and local development, tying such assistance to participation
in interstate resource development planning processes could provide the basis for an effective Federal
Coordination or Federal Coercion approach. See Note, supra note 68, at 1456-58.
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dinated local planning. However, the federal program for implementing
the Act never transcended beyond a weak concept of Federal Coordination
and, indeed, it recently has slipped into a state of minimal Federal Coordination commitment. As one commentator has concluded: "In the 1980s
the Federal Government appears to be withdrawing interest in and support
for metropolitan regional institutions. The institutions themselves seem
to. be surviving, but their orientation has changed.""'
The initial positive reaction to the Cooperation Act is recounted in this
history of interstate planning:
[t]he federal government encouraged the creation of metropolitan
planning agencies in areas where none previously existed and began
supporting both established and new ones financially so that they
could help fill this gap. Later, as metropolitan coordination began
to take hold, nonmetropolitan areawide clearinghouses and state
clearinghouses were added to the system to help facilitate coordination of federally-aided and direct federal activities nationwide.
State, regional, and local comprehensive planning was specified in
the act-along with national objectives and the viewpoints of state
and local officials-as a prime factor to be considered in coordinating
these federally-supported activities and in making reasoned choices
among conflicting projects.79
The Office of Management and Budget, the agency delegated the responsibility for promulgating rules under the Act, issued OMB Circular A-95
in 1968 to establish a uniform process by which consultations under the
Act could take place." Circular A-95 set up "clearinghouses"--essentially, areawide and state agencies established to facilitate state and local
reviews as provided by the Act. Six hundred such clearinghouses were
designated, with such responsibilities as (1) receiving information about
projects, plans, and proposals to be reviewed, (2) notifying affected parties at the level of government where the clearinghouse operates, (3)
collecting comments from notified parties, (4) making their own reviews
of the proposed projects, plans, and activities, (5) transmitting all comments to the applicant and/or federal agency responsible for acting on
the reviewed proposal, and (6) being notified of the subsequent federal
decision and the reasons for any federal actions contrary to advice from
the state and local officials. 8
Ultimately, Circular A-95 covered 300 federal programs. Most significantly, the Circular A-95 process was designated the method for implementing Section 102(2)(c) of the National Environmental Policy Act,82
78.
79.
80.
(Nov.
81.
82.

Osboum, supra note 76, at 2.
Bulletin, supra note 76, at 25.
Circular A-95 was issued pursuant to the Memorandum of Nov. 8, 1968; 33 Fed. Reg. 16487
13, 1968).
See Bulletin, supra note 76, at 22.
42 U.S.C. §§4321-4370a (1982).
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which requires consultations with local officials regarding draft environmental impact statements. 3 As one commentator reports, however, the
Circular A-95 superstructure quickly became top-heavy:
The four prime difficulties have been that it has generated too much
paperwork, cost too much, been funded inadequately in light of all
that has been expected and not had enough effect on federal agency
decisions.
Some A-95 clearinghouses have been so discouraged by these problems that they retreated to a largely perfunctory performance of their
notification duties-adding no substantive analysis of their own and
caring little whether others do either. This reaction has been especially noticeable at the state level where at least two statewide clearinghouses have ceased functioning altogether and several others are
barely alive."
Some proposals for streamlining the process followed, but no modifications were implemented.8"
Increased federal funding would have helped counter the Circular A95 program's practical flaws and would have exhibited a federal commitment to the process. But perhaps the greatest defect on the federal
government's part was a lack of commitment to the outcome of the
process. States could not be expected to devote resources to the process
if they felt that the federal decisionmaking process would remain largely
unaffected. Federal decisionmakers should have been required to achieve
results consistent with state plans, much like the Coastal Zone Management Act is supposed to work. 6 The federal response was just the opposite, however.
Federal commitments to interstate planning were stalled in the 1970s.
Indeed, after several legislative setbacks, the federal policy took a reversal. Circular A-95 was revoked on July 16, 1982, by Executive Order
12372.7 Although ostensibly it seeks to foster an "intergovernmental
partnership and a strengthened federalism,"" Executive Order 12372
terminated the clearinghouse system set up by Circular A-95 and encouraged states to replace federal planning mechanisms with their own. Federally-funded planning organizations are specifically discouraged. 9 While
83. See Bulletin, supra note 76, at 22.
84. Id. at 23.
85. See id.

86. See 16 U.S.C. § 1456 (1982). The Coastal Zone Management Act was intended to coordinate
federal and state development affecting the coastal zones of the states. Observers have criticized the
federal response in recent years as falling short of these coordination objectives. See, e.g., 18 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 468-69 (May 29, 1987); see generally Finnell, Intergovernmental Relationships in
Coastal Land Management, 25 NAT. REs. J. 31 (1985).

87. Executive Order 12372, 47 Fed. Reg. 30959 (July 14, 1982).
88. Id. (introductory comments).
89. See id. §§ 2(d) and 2(f).
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the new scheme does require federal officials to explain the basis for any
decision inconsistent with state concerns,' it is clear that not much is

required of the federal officials in that regard. There is no reason to
believe that states will view Executive Order 12372 as signaling strengthened federal commitment to the "consistency" concept, and thus states
may now be even less committed to the processes prescribed by the Act.
Many states may simply opt out of the greater part of the Act's scope by
implementing the provision of Executive Order 12372 allowing states to
exclude certain federal programs from review and comment.91
Because of its disregard for the "tragedy of the commons" effect,
Executive Order 12372 is premised on faulty reasoning. The message of
its scheme is that states should be allowed to tailor the federal involvement
in interstate resource development planning to their needs and desires.
That approach would be realistic if there were any reason to believe that
the states themselves are committed to a federal-state or state-state partnership in interstate planning. With no national policy requiring their

participation in such a partnership, the focus of state planning efforts is
bound to turn inward. Lack of commitment to the coordinating role by
the federal government therefore can render the Federal Coordination
approach a meaningless ritual rather than the positive force it potentially
could be with active federal participation.
CONCLUSIONS
Pollution and resource development affect the interstate environment
90. See id. § 2(c).
91. See id. § 3(b). Further expression of the federal government's benign role in coordination of
such interstate planning issues is found in President Reagan's recent proclamation on Federalism,
Executive Order 12612 (Oct. 26, 1987), 52 Fed. Reg. 41685 (Oct. 30, 1987). EO 12612 purports
to "restore the division of governmental responsibilities between the national government and the
States." 52 Fed. Reg. at 41685. However, coordination of interstate planning is not a subject of EO
12612. Indeed, the basic thrust of the proclamation is to discourage any federal role in interstate
planning, as expressed in Section 3(b) of the document:
Federal action limiting the policymaking discretion of the States should be taken only
where constitutional authority for the action is clear and certain and the national activity
is necessitated by the presence of a problem in national scope. For the purposes of
this Order:
(I) It is important to recognize the distinction between problems of national scope
(which may justify federal action) and problems that are merely common to the
States (which will not justify federal action because individual States, acting
individually or together, can effectively deal with them).
(2) Constitutional authority for the federal action is clear and certain only when authority for the action may be found in a specific provision of the Constitution, there
is no provision in the Constitution prohibiting federal action, and the action does
not encroach upon authority reserved to the States.
Id. at 41686. Plainly, EO 12372 provides no impetus for states to turn to the federal government
for a coordinating role; now, however, EO 12612 removes any impetus the federal agencies may
have had for adopting meaningful actions under a Federal Coordination approach.
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substantially. Responses to these problems must be equally as substantial.
As much as politicians may want to deal with these problems through
state-level regulation, no serious approach to interstate environmental law
can avoid relying on interstate mechanisms for the regulation of the
interstate environment. Leaving the task of interstate environmental regulation to the states only invites paper tiger responses. Hence, unless
state or federal governments approach interstate environmental regulation
with new-found commitment, the interstate environment will suffer from
benign neglect.
Three methods of approaching interstate environmental regulation have
been reviewed. Each approach has great potential for dealing with particular problems. For example, when interstate pollution presents problems of national scope, as in the case of air pollution, extensive federal
regulation is an appropriate means of inducing state behavior. But the
Federal Control mechanism must have plenary authority, or else the nuances
of interstate relations will present obstacles to enforcement. On the other
hand, when the subject resource is associated principally with local interests, as in the case of water, but nevertheless is capable of transmitting
interstate effects, Interstate Cooperation approaches may provide an effective response. But again, no interstate compact or similar device will be
useful unless it establishes an interstate authority with at least as much
power as might be expected to be vested in a federal agency under the
Federal Coercion approach. Lastly, when the subject resource is inextricably tied to local interests, as with land development, interstate management can be achieved through a Federal Coordination approach by
encouragement of state and interstate planning bodies. Centralized coordination thereby fosters decentralized cooperation. Cooperation will not
come about, however, if the coordination measures go only halfway or
rely purely upon voluntary participation.
Each of the three representative programs discussed herein-the Clean
Air Act, interstate water quality compacts, and the Intergovernmental
Cooperation Act-illustrates the potential pitfalls of interstate environmental management. The greatest negative force on these programs seems
to have been a failure to transcend the political pressures caused by state
protectionist policies and interstate competition. The necessities of interstate environmental management do present some painful political questions, but sacrifices will have to be made if effective solutions are sought.
The problem essentially is not one of outmoded approaches, it is one of
outmoded politics.

